National Political Influence and the Catholic Church by Nash \u2700, Jennifer
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Political Science Department
2000
National Political Influence and the Catholic
Church
Jennifer Nash '00
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Nash '00, Jennifer, "National Political Influence and the Catholic Church" (2000). Honors Projects. Paper 29.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj/29
National Political Influence and the Catholic Church
 
Jennifer Nash
 
•
 
Previous literature has focused on the political importance ofthe Catholic Church within 
democratic transitions, while little research has followed the role ofthe Church in post­
transitional settings. The present research acknowledges a marked variation in the 
political influence among the national Churches ofPoland, Brazil, Hungary and Spain 
following the institution ofdemocracy. Within the national context, the Church's 
religious mission, the association ofthe Church with the former regime and the influence 
ofthe International Catholic Church emerge as explanatoryfactors. 
Democratic transitions have become a topic of great discussion among political 
scholars in recent years with what seems to be a domino effect of democratization 
beginning in Latin America in the 1970s and continuing in Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s. In many of these transitions the Catholic ChurchI has played a crucial role as the 
protector of civil society during periods of communist and right-wing authoritarian rule, 
as well as taking an active role in promoting the establishment of democracy (Bruneau, 
1994; Levine, 1980; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Perez-Diaz, 1993; Ramet, 1987). While the 
Church's political role in transition is important, significantly fewer scholars have 
explored how democracy has affected the Catholic Church within the national context 
(Eberts, 1998; Ramet, 1999; Vilarino and Tizon, 1998). Even fewer have attempted 
cross-national comparisons of the Church, thus permitting generalizations to be made 
regarding the political influence of the Church since the institution of democratic 
governance (Casanova, 1990 and 1993; Gill, 1998). 
With the establishment of democracy, one would expect the Church to flourish. In 
many instances the Church was the only organized body capable of exerting political 
authority within a burgeoning democratic society. However, using abortion policy 
disputes as an indicator of the Church's political influence, it is clear the cases of Spain, 
Brazil, Hungary and Poland vary extensively. The Polish Church has maintained the 
most political influence followed by Brazil, Hungary and Spain (Neilsen, 1991; Volenski 
I Throughout this paper when referring to the Church, I am alluding to the Catholic Church within a 
national context. When referring to the Catholic Church's international hierarchy, I will refer to either the 
Vatican or the International Church. 
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and Gryzmala-Mosczynska, 1997; Gautier, 1998; Casanova, 1993; Linz, 1991; Morris, 
1993). In the Brazilian and Polish cases, the Church played an instrumental role in the 
democratic revolution, making a political decline in the Church almost inconceivable. 
While initially these Churches exerted great political influence, questions arise as to why 
their influence has gradually declined since the inauguration of democracy. 
Political Influence of the Church 
The influence of a given Church is defined by the Church's ability to achieve 
certain moral and political objectives within specific policy areas. The Churches included 
in this study have differed in the policy disputes they have chosen to engage. In 
Hungary, the Church in the post-communist period has clashed with the government over 
levels ofreligious funding and the restitution ofreligious lands. The Brazilian Church 
has been active within the realm of social policy. All ofthe Churches, however, prefer 
policies that restrict abortion. Only some are able to achieve or maintain restrictive 
policies. Abortion policy is an effective indicator for determining the political clout 
assigned to each case because the Catholic Church is fundamentally opposed to induced' 
abortion of any kind. In April 1999 the Vatican went so far as to condemn the distribution 
of emergency contraception by United Nations agencies to Kosovo refugees who had 
been raped (A Church Disguised, 1999). In terms of influence, if a restrictive law is in 
place the Church will, in most instances, not exert itself politically unless there is a 
challenge to the law. In countries where a more permissive abortion law exists, this is 
telling of the Church's inability to influence policy in a direct, concrete manner. The 
following table illustrates this idea. 
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•	 Sept. 22, 1998 liberalized abortion bill sought to allow an abortion if "severe 
personal, family, or social conflict within the ftrst twelve weeks of pregnancy" 
•	 172 favored, 173 opposed, 1 abstained (Bosch, 1998) 
•	 Currently abortion allowed in cases of rape, fetal malformation, or danger to 
mother's health (mental or physical) 
•	 Passed under Socialist majority Oct. 6, 1983-186 favored, 109 opposed 
•	 Dec. 17, 1993 Hungarian parliament offtcially sanctioned country's abortion 
practices, allowing women abortions when it presented a risk to her health or in 
cases of rape or if other "weighty social considerations" (normally financial) are 
accepted by a committee 
•	 Public abortion debate 1990-92 because the Supreme Court ruled the right to 
life was safeguarded by Hungarian Constitution. Court mandated parliament to 
decide under which conditions to allow abortion while still maintaining this 
safeguard 
•	 Woman must visit social worker from family protection for counseling on 
abortion, its risks, and contraception; must sign statement admitting in "crisis 
situation; must wait three days before procedure; husbands must attend, if 
possible; hospitals and doctors decide whether they will perform abortions; 
price of procedure doubled; parental consent for those under 18 (Gal, 1994) 
•	 Support emergency contraception (CRLP Worldwide) 
•	 1940 abortion law 
•	 Illegal under all circumstances except when pregnancy endangers the mothers 
life or is the result of rape (Lupiya, 1998) 
•	 May 28, 1997 liberalized law considered unconstitutional on grounds that 
human life is of fundamental value and protected from conception. 
Reestablished 1993 anti-abortion law (Eberts, 1998). 
•	 Abortion allowed with parental authorization (for minor), in cases of rape and 
incest, and fetal impairment 
•	 Polish Federation for Women and Planning submitted restrictive law to UN 
committee; UN recommended it be changed because it presented a threat to 
women's right to health2 
•	 The Polish Church submitted restrictive law just following institution of 
democracy, failed but restrictive measure involving Church compromise 
instituted in 1993 
•	 Support emergency contraception but costly and difftcult to obtain (CRLP 
Worldwide) 
The table shows a great degree of variation in the political influence of national 
Churches with regard to abortion policy. The Spanish Church is characterized as least 
influential because the liberalization the current abortion law is possible in the near 
future. In 1998, a liberal bill allowing abortion in cases of severe personal, familial, or 
social distress within the first trimester lost by a single vote in the Spanish legislature 
3 
(Bosch, 1998). The push for a more liberal law, which is backed by public opinion, 
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suggests that the Church is engaging in a losing battle over abortion policy. The Spanish 
Church has publicly declared its neutrality and rejection ofthe political sphere, but still 
maintains a place in moral political debates. Its inability to prevent liberal abortion 
legislation clearly shows the Church's lack of direct influence even in the moral arena, 
despite the fact that the majority of Spaniards are Roman Catholic (Casanova, 1993). 
The Hungarian Church ranks as more influential than the Spanish Church, despite 
the fact that Hungary today has a more liberal abortion policy than Spain. Under 
communism abortion was available on demand, suggesting Hungary's "liberal" abortion 
policy has become more restrictive over time. As Susan Gal points out "there are other 
aspects of the law that leave very much open the possibility of informal and structural 
effects that could have restrictive consequences" (1994, p256). The 1956 Abortion 
Admissibility Law provided abortion on demand until 1970s when the communist state 
became concerned with the declining birth rate. In 1974 regulations required women to 
appear before a committee prior to obtaining an abortion. Although the committee could 
refuse to consent, in general it was simply a formality and abortion remained readily 
available (Corrin, 1992). Keeping this legacy in mind, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court gave the parliament until the end of 1992 to codify an abortion policy which 
neither outlawed abortion nor made it freely available (Moss, 1994). Thus, the 
parliament was forced to create a relatively liberal law since it could not ban abortion and 
86% of Hungarians favored a woman's right to an abortion (Corrin, 1994). Despite 
concerns over the ability of the Hungarian population to replace itself, the liberal policy 
was instituted3• 
2 March 21, 1964 the Holy See is regarded as a non-member state permanent observer allowing it to
 
occasionally participate in General Assembly discussions and decisions and participate in UN International
 
Conferences. The Holy See, however, has no voting rights.
 
3The abortion debate in Hungary is very much motivated by the inability of the population to replace itself.
 
When viewed in this light, the abortion debate becomes a discourse of national survival and not solely an
 
issue of women's rights.
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The greater political influence of the Brazilian Church can be seen in the fact that 
Brazil's highly restrictive abortion law has remained unchanged since 1940. Despite 
high rates of illegal abortions and the inaccessibility of sufficient means ofbirth control, 
organized and influential women's groups in Brazil have not sought to oppose the Church 
on abortion issues. The legalization of abortion is generally seen as an "impossible 
dream" by feminists (Waylen, 1994). The prestige of the Brazilian Church is further 
, 
exemplified by its enormous role in affecting the government's social policy. The Church 
has established direct governmental links via the Brazilian Conference of Bishops 
(CNBB) and recently created a popular social plan known as The Way to the New 
Millennium4• 
The Catholic Church in Poland has been the most directly active in the political 
realm of all the cases in this study. The Church has sponsored numerous anti-abortion 
bills and many have been successful. On January 7, 1993, the Church sponsored an anti­
abortion bill that passed allowing abortion only in cases of rape and incest, fetus damage, 
and when a woman's life was at risk (Kulczycki, 1994). This bill established criminal 
punishments for individuals found performing illegal abortions. When a liberalized anti... 
abortion law was passed in 1996, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled it to be 
unconstitutional in 1997. The court argued that human life is of fundamental value and 
must be protected from conception (Eberts, 1998). The Polish Church has blocked 
numerous referendum attempts to resolve the issue, even when 1.3 million signatures 
were gathered (Hillar, 1995). Using the above criteria the Polish Church has 
unequivocally established itself as the most influential among the cases. 
4 "Way to the New Millennium" four year plan was introduced in 1997 by Church to focus on different area 
of human rights each year. 
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Any number of factors can help to explain why Church influence might decline in 
the aftermath of a transition from authoritarianism. The literature points to secularization 
(Soper and Fetzer, forthcoming; Perez-Diaz, 1993; Casanova, 1990 and 1993; Martin, 
1978); pluralization (Volenski and Grzymala, 1997; Mainwaring, 1986; Long, 1988); the 
former regime type (Waylen, 1994; Ramet, 1997; Wolchik and Jaquette, 1998); the 
-
extent to which the Church was associated with the former regime (Casanova, 1990 and 
1993; Perez-Diaz, 1993); the influence of the Vatican (Della Cava, 1990 and 1993), the 
religious mission of the Church (Mainwaring, 1986; Perez-Diaz, 1993); and the type of 
transition that occurred (Waylen, 1994; Ramet, 1987). Secularization is a global trend so 
it cannot explain variations across the four cases in this study. Likewise, increased 
religious pluralism is a natural by-product of democratization and therefore affects all of 
the selected cases. Denominational differences are controlled for in the research design, 
as Catholicism is the dominant religion (65%+). The type of transition is held constant 
throughout the study; all four cases have been described by scholars as "negotiated" or 
"gradual" transitions (Waylen, 1994). The literature suggests the legacy of communist 
and atheist rhetoric should create an initial surge of support for freedom of religion, 
thereby giving the Church in post-communist systems greater political leverage than 
Churches in former rightist authoritarian regimes (Perez-Diaz, 1993; Casanova, 1993; 
Wolchik and Jaquette, 1998). The cases selected, however, include two formerly 
communist countries (Poland and Hungary) and two countries with a rightist­
authoritarian past (Brazil and Spain); and there is no correlation between the political 
influence of the Church and the former regime type, the Brazilian Church is more 
influential than the Hungarian Church. 
Having eliminated several explanations throughout the case selection, three 
factors remain as possible predictors of Church influence after democratic transition: the 
degree of association between the Church and the former regime, the religious mission of 
6 
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the Church, and the influence of the International Church. The table below describes 
these variables in each of the cases. 
Poland Brazil Hungary Spain 
(most influence) (least influence) 
Church -little co-optation -little co-optation -Church associated -pillar of the 
Association of Church under of Church with communist Francoist state 
with Former 
Regime 
communism 
-nurtured civil 
society and 
-nurtured civil 
society and dissent 
aimed at regime 
regime 
-seen as a sell-out 
to the regime in 
until the 
documents of 
Vatican II issued 
nationhood under -key in transition the eyes of the (1962-65) 
communism to democracy laity and religious 
-instrumental in orders 
the transition to 
democracy 
Religious -mission still -mission at both -individual mission -serve spiritual 
Mission appears to be 
national 
the individual and 
national level 
-national mission 
not spiritual but 
financial 
needs of individual 
Influence of -seen as means to -liberation vs. -no major -no major 
the re-evangelize conservative instances of occurrences of 
International 
Church 
Europe 
-example for other 
Churches dealing 
theology 
-Vatican replacing 
liberal bishops 
International 
Church exerting 
control or 
International 
Church exerting 
control or 
with democratic with more influence influence 
transition conservative-7 sup­
-intervene in pressing popular 
Polish Church's church which was 
political outlook created to be 
politically active 
and fight for 
justice 
Influence in politics is greatest where the Church opposed authoritarian rule, sees its 
mission as national, and is strongly influenced by and tied to the Vatican. The following 
case studies more sufficiently explain why such a variation exists among the four national 
Churches where Catholicism is undoubtedly the dominant religion. 
Church and Former Regime: Friend or Foe? 
Perhaps one of the single most important indicators of political influence is the 
degree to which the Church fostered civil society under the former regime. In the Polish 
and Brazilian cases, the Church was highly involved in protecting the societal 
7 
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organization within the country and in many cases the Church allowed opposition forces 
to meet within the church. In Spain, and to a lesser degree in Hungary, the Church was 
the puppet of the former regime. The Church's association with oppressive regimes acts 
as an indicator of the public perception of the Catholic Church. In countries where the 
Church was a leader in the democratic movement, the laity easily view the Church as 
reformist, adaptable, and "for the people". In cases where the Church is psychologically 
-
associated with the former regime in the mind of the public, the Church is seen as more 
traditional or conservative, static, and statist, thus distancing the Church from the laity. 
In Poland the Church has long been the protector of Polish nationhood. David 
Martin rightly observes that "where religion is imposed from above by a conqueror it is 
thereby weakened, whereas when it is the focus of resistance it is thereby strengthened" 
(Casanova, 1990, p25). Throughout partitioning and the rule ofmany conquerors, the 
Polish nation has been protected by the people and the Church. Jose Casanova observes 
that, historically, "given the absence of a Polish state, the crucial factor [was] the 
identification of church and nation at a time when the Catholic Church [was] the only 
institution able somewhat to cut across the partition ofPrussian, Russian and Austrian 
Poland" (1990, p26). This fusion ofPolish nationalist sentiment and Catholicism took 
place in spite ofVatican disapproval of Polish uprisings. 
When communism took hold in Poland in 1944, the communist regime 
continually tried to break the bond between Catholicism and the nation without success. 
The regime failed to incorporate the Church into the state machinery. The communist 
party attempted to exert selective repression on certain members of the Catholic 
hierarchy. However, the use of coercive means actually consolidated the Church's 
position by transforming the repressed figures into national heroes or martyrs. The 
regime attempted to re-write history, to make the Church appear as the enemy to Polish 
nationhood, privatize religion, and even create a "socialist man" adherent to a new civil 
religion (Ramet, 1997). In essence nearly every tactic used by communist leaders to 
8 
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weaken the influence of the Church failed, allowing the Polish Church to counteract the 
socialization efforts of the regime and increase the number and strength of its believers. 
Not only did the Church escape attempts to weaken its hold on Polish society but it also 
put up a formidable resistance to further encroachment ofthe state, inevitably ending in 
the downfall of the communist state. The Polish Church over time has protected the 
sense ofPolish nationhood, rejected association with communism, and played a major 
-
role in the formation of a democratic state. Therefore, the Polish Church maintains it has 
a rightful place within the political sphere, in a way which the Spanish or Hungarian 
Church does not. 
In comparison with Polish Catholicism, the Brazilian Church has been a 
historically weak institution. In general the evangelization of Brazil was left to religious 
orders, particularly the Jesuits. In 1890 the Brazilian Church was officially separated 
from the state. The Church was against the principle of separation; however, the 
liberation from state controls was welcomed. Nonetheless, the absence of state funding 
took its toll on the Brazilian Church and it was not until Vargas came to power in 1937 
that the Church, under Dom Leme, was able to reestablish close ties with the state. 
Under Leme, Catholic Action took hold and advocated the christianizing ofthe elite in an 
effort to gain access to the state (Schneider, 1991). The Church was certainly not as 
entangled in the state as the Spanish Church under Franco, but it still maintained ties to 
the state until the mid-l 960s. In the early 1960s the Brazilian Conference ofBishops 
(CNBB) contained an elite core ofprogressives who attempted to adopt radical reform 
from above in association with the radical Catholic Left and the Popular Action party. 
The conservative members of the CNBB saw this progressiveness as unrepresentative, 
but in 1964 a military coup ended all hopes of radical reform from above or below 
(Mainwaring, 1986). In the early 1970s "the People's Church" emerged in Brazil, acting 
as a bastion of opposition to authoritarian rule. The Church fought for reform under 
authoritarian rule, specifically the end of state violence, agrarian reform, and the 
9 
colonization of the Amazon (Mainwaring, 1986). While the history in Poland and Brazil 
differ, both Churches opposed the regime and were seen as the purveyors of reform and 
democracy. The Polish Church has battled in the name ofthe nation for centuries; 
however, the Brazilian Church has just recently begun to fight for the people. 
In both Poland and Brazil the Church acted as a voice for the people when 
regimes silenced both civil and political society. In Brazil, the most widely noted form of 
political influence by the Brazilian Church has been the creation ofbase Christian 
Communities (CEBsi. CEBs were more influential in Brazil than any other Latin 
American country for several reasons. First, the poor were leaving the Catholic Church 
and converting to Protestant sects and Afro-Brazilian religions (Vasquez, 1998). 
Traditional clerical means were no longer capable oftending to the spiritual needs of the 
Brazilian population. The Brazilian Church has always been short on priests, given the 
size and population ofBrazil. CEBs became an alternative model of the Church 
promoting self-organization and communal growth, while requiring minimal clerical 
supervision (Casanova, 1990). CEBs essentially promoted participation at various levels 
giving the Brazilian people the tools they needed to change the world they were 
accustomed to. During the transition, the Church encouraged political participation, 
voting, and was accused of favoring leftist parties such as the Workers' Party (PT). 
Because the Church fostered civil society under authoritarianism it has generally kept its 
privileged position within Brazilian society. 
In Poland, the Church was more politically active beginning in 1976 when an 
amendment was added to the constitution giving the communist party a monopoly within 
the state. The Church and the people protested against the amendment since it implied a 
social contract ensuring personal rights provided citizens abided communist doctrine. 
This action eventually led to the formation of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) 
10
 
and culminated in the emergence of Solidarity which was symbolic of the nation, 
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democracy and the workers. Catholic intellectuals unified with workers, students and 
artists against the communist enemy. These intellectuals played an instrumental role in 
the founding of the KOR and have remained official and unofficial advisers to the 
movement (Taras, 1995). 
The Polish Church was eager to capitalize on its high support by the public and 
carve out its political niche in the new democratic order. Many churches became 
campaign headquarters for Solidarity in the semi-free 1989 elections. In the 1990 
presidential elections the Church had a vested interest in two Catholic candidates, Lech 
Walesa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Walesa was favored mainly because Mazowiecki was 
espoused to be more liberal (Eberts, 1998). While the Polish Church remained officially 
neutral, individual priests had no qualms in leading parishioners to vote one way or 
another (Eberts, 1998). While such political activism has since led to divisions within the 
hierarchy and the laity of the Polish Church, the public initially embraced the activism of 
the Church understanding the role it played in the reform process (Eberts, 1998). 
In Hungary, by way of contrast, the Church has never played the role of the 
dominant Church as is so characteristic in Poland. During the Reformation, the 
Hungarian Church allied itself with the Hapsburg government to fend off the threat of 
Protestantism. This required the Church to fuse with a secular state that set up 
commissions to check the Church's power (Moss, 1994). The Church generally 
submitted to state enforced restrictions and in 1781 the Edict of Toleration came to pass 
allowing Protestantism to re-emerge. In 1867 during the Ausgleich, which produced a 
dual monarchy, Catholicism remained the state religion in the Austrian portion of the 
dynasty but not in the Hungarian half (Ramet, 1987). Following the Ausgleich, the 
government provided subsidies to Protestant Churches but none to the Catholic Church 
5 CEBs are small (10-70 members) grassroots organizations sponsored by the Church. Meetings are used to 
discuss scripture and the bearing it had on members lives. These groups emphasize equality and 
II 
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forcing the Church to cooperate with the government. It is not surprising the Hungarian 
Church simply accepted communist control, because there was little history of real 
institutionalization. This pattern of acquiescence and weakness continued into the late 
communist era. In the 1970s and 1980s the Hungarian opposition forces received little 
support from the Church. As a consequence, when the communist regime collapsed in 
1989, the Church was excluded from roundtable negotiations (Moss, 1994). The 
Church's past has discredited it as a political force and separated it from participation in 
nationalist and right wing populist movements. The failure of the Christian Democrats to 
win seats in the 1998 election testifies to this point. 
The Spanish Church is even less influential than the Hungarian though it has no 
significant religious rivals. The CIA World Factbook claims 99% of Spaniards consider 
themselves Catholic, but other statistics suggest 94-95% are Catholic (World Values 
Survey, 1991). Victor Perez-Diaz describes the alliance between the Church and the 
Francoist state as the realization of a denominational state. The Church's ideal was a 
state "consistent in its structure, its legislation and its civil servants, subordinate to it in at 
least some areas, and providing resources for the Church to carry out its objectives" 
(1993, pI32). The Francoist state met these criteria allowing the Church to share in the 
decision-making process with regards to education and the controlling of social customs. 
The state supported the Church financially. It is estimated that the state gave the Church 
nearly 5 million pesetas per year in the early 1970s, the equivalent of a medium sized 
ministerial budget (Perez-Diaz, 1993). Franco's regime depended on the Church for 
legitimacy both within the country and the international community (Gunther, 1986). So, 
the Spanish Church essentially aligned itself with the Francoist regime in order to receive 
a political voice and the resources necessary to effectively assert its platform ofNational 
Catholicism. 
participation. While not inherently political, many groups espoused Liberation Theology (Gautier). 
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In 1971 following years of internal division over the Church's religious 
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orientation, Archbishop Enrique y Tarac6n was nominated as president of the 
Conferencia Episcopal. He was a moderate and was extremely influential in moving the 
Spanish Church to break ties with the regime and embrace liberal pluralism. By 1975, 
the Spanish Church was utilizing rhetoric associated with freedom and liberty, estranging 
itself from the regime which had based itself on Catholic ideals (Gunther, 1986). The 
-
Church increasingly fostered a relationship with the democratic opposition. According to 
Perez-Diaz this was possible only because the Church leaders of the opposition had 
discarded their anti-religious/anti-clerical attitudes, a new political class to some extent 
had been formed by the Church, and the Church deliberately did not form or support a 
Christian Democratic party. Although the Church played an important role in the 
transition from 1975-1978, nothing can erase its huge influence within the Francoist 
regime or its role in the Civil War. The Spanish Church understood this and 
appropriately proclaimed its political neutrality. The Church accepted the principles of a 
non-denominational state and religious freedom. The Church was recognized as a 
"sociological fact" within the 1978 constitution, thus acknowledging the symbolic role 
the Catholic Church has maintained within Spanish society. 
While the Spanish Church battles to maintain its religious core ofbelievers, its 
political decline has been taken more gracefully than in the other cases. The Spanish 
Church has acknowledged its mistakes and tried to heal the wounds created by its role in 
the Civil War. The withdrawal of the Spanish Church from the political realm while 
certainly attributable to an increase in consumerism, secularization, and the decline in 
morality, the Church's association with the Franco regime should not be overlooked. 
Religious Mission 
Scott Mainwaring claims that the way the Church intervenes in politics depends 
fundamentally on how it perceives its religious mission (1986). One would expect those 
13 
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national Churches seeing their role as moral and religious providers to individuals would 
seek a less overtly political role. National churches perceiving their religious mission as 
the guardians of religion and morality among an entire nation or society would tend to be 
more involved in politics. This, although, is not to say that a Church involved in politics 
at the institutional level will be publicly supported. The intense politicization of a 
Church can have negative repercussions ifits actions are not supported by the laity. 
Victor Perez~Diaz extends Mainwaring's assertion by outlining the major 
components of a religious message. The religious message of a church can be reduced to 
three elements, " a message ofmeaning, a message ofsalvation, and a message ofmoral 
community, all ofwhich take as their point of reference a god or other supernatural 
figures, which the church represents, from which it receives its spiritual resources and 
with which it mediates" (1993). Meaning refers to an explanation for the causes of the 
apparent chaos of reality, i.e. life, death, unexplained events. Salvation "is not only 
setting the mind at ease by creating order but also, and more especially, a case of 
satisfying human affections and emotions" (Perez-Diaz, 1993). Finally the moral 
community involves a group ofthe faithful both visible and invisible, i.e. clergy, 
believers, God, virgins, and saints. Perez-Diaz unduly limits this category by failing to 
suggest that the bounds of this moral community are not set. It seems likely that a moral 
community could include society as a whole if the Church felt it was their duty to 
"moralize" the national society and not just the faithful. The moral community is the 
most beneficial component ofPerez-Diaz's definition ofa religious message because it 
establishes the scope of influence a church is seeking within a democracy. 
Clearly during the protracted transition from Communist rule, the Polish Catholic 
Church never wavered as the protector of civil society and the Polish nation. The Church 
under communism was the symbol for freedom and dissent (Casanova, 1992; Taras, 
1995). Mirella Eberts writes, 
14 
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Poles flocked to the Churches in symbolic opposition to the 
communist authorities, as they had done for centuries whenever 
Poland was under foreign occupation. During the turbulent 
Solidarity years, Catholic and non-Catholic activists and 
intellectuals gathered in churches across the country. The Church 
once again became the symbol of freedom and firmly established 
itself as the only legitimate authority in the country. (1998) 
In May 1989, just following the collapse of communism, the Sejm passed numerous 
measures relating to the position of the Church. The Statute on Freedom of Conscience 
and Creed reintroduced freedom of religion, including the right to express or keep silent 
on religious matters. The Statute on Social Insurance of Clergymen put the financial 
burden of the clergy almost entirely on the state. The Church was given autonomy from 
the state thus permitting the Church to make its own hierarchical appointments. The 
Church was offered major tax concessions and within a year of the fall of communism it 
had won the battle to reintroduce religious instruction in public schools (Eberts, 1993). 
The legal concessions bestowed on the Polish Church were the culmination of its battle 
against foreign domination and communism. The Church successfully protected Polish 
nationality and was granted a variety oflegal rights during the transition. The Polish 
Church interpreted these concessions as supportive ofthe dominant political role that it 
maintained for so many years. Thus, the Polish Church secured a position as a dominant 
institution giving it the means to promote itself at the national level. 
In the Brazilian case, under the vision of "New Christendom," the Church sought 
to combat "alien" ideologies with organizations that targeted the "faithless" segments of 
society. This neo-Christendom vision took place throughout Latin America and Spain 
from the late l800s to the 1950s mainly targeting university students, middle-class youth, 
urban professionals and urban workers. The thrust behind this ideology was the Catholic 
Action movement (Gill, 1998). The neo-Christian ideology was founded upon a dualistic 
conception ofhistory, one secular and the other religious. This model attempted to plant 
Christian values within the secular world in an effort to inject it with religious principles. 
15 
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However, the documents of Vatican 116 reversed this ideology suggesting God created the 
world and only one history exists. Such an ideological shift caused crisis in Brazil where 
the Catholic Action movement had finnly implanted organizations in universities and the 
labor force. The Brazilian Church quickly adapted to the ideology of Vatican II creating 
a model of grassroots organization with such innovations as CEBs. The Brazilian Church 
in the 1960s and 1970s was the model of a progressive church. Membership in CEBs 
was nearly one million and there was a 700% increase in the number of seminarians 
during this period (Cleary, 1997). In the 1980's, under the direction of Pope John Paul II, 
the Vatican began to curtail the progressiveness of the Brazilian Church by continually 
replacing progressive bishops with conservative bishops. 
Such a move caused a crisis of religious ideology and vision within the Brazilian 
Church. The first faction was conservative, according to theologian Clodovis Boff, and 
demanded centralization, hegemony and obedience within the Brazilian Church. This 
vision focused on the Church as an institution while the progressive faction characterized 
the church as a "servant within society requiring the church and its laity to be more 
participatory." Yet Edward L. Cleary proposes the days of partisan politics and religious 
divide are ending in Brazil as shown by the four year plan introduced by the Brazilian 
Church in 1997 known as the Way to the New Millennium. Under this plan the Brazilian 
Church proposes to focus on a different area of human rights each year, beginning with 
civil rights and ending with economic rights. What this suggests is that the Brazilian 
Church has sought to build civil society and bolster the sense of Brazilian citizenship and 
democracy. There has also been a reduction ofthe public role ofthe Brazilian Church 
since the progressiveness ofthe 1970s and concessions are still given to the tendency 
6 Vatican II theology "stressed a very different notion ofthe Church as the people of God, assigned a more 
important role to the laity, redefmed the authority of the Pope over the whole Church and the bishops over 
the diocese" (Mainwaring, 1986). Vatican II theology stressed the need for social justice and vowed to 
help the less fortunate, this came to be known as the option for the poor. The International Church 
accepted pluralism and rejected all forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The Church accepted the 
principles ofliberal democracy (Perez-Diaz, 1993). 
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toward centralization in the Church. Clovodis Boff cites a direct link between the 
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president of the CNBB and the government since 1991 to coordinate and advise on 
governmental efforts to resolve social questions. The Brazilian experience of ideological 
division and recent reconciliation has led the Church to acquire prestige through its effort 
to improve the social conditions within the country rather than through a privileged status 
within the government (Cleary, 1997). 
The Hungarian Church undoubtedly appeals to individuals rather than the entire 
nation, mainly due to its past connections with the communist party. The Catholic 
hierarchy initially supported Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany mainly because it 
gained land and people through the alliance. Eventually, however, the Church resisted 
the government's control through the Catholic Social People's Union. Under communist 
rule all Catholic orders were banned, half of the seminaries were closed, and all Church 
appointments were required to be approved by the State Office of the Church (Gautier, 
1998). The committed members of the Catholic order and the laity felt the institutional 
Church sold out to the communist regime. Those orders dissolved on legal grounds by 
the regime continued underground. Base communities stepped in to act as a substitute for 
the withdrawal of the institutional Church. Thus, with the institutional Church severely 
weakened during the communist rule and the belief among the public and laity that the 
withdrawal was self-imposed, it is no wonder the Hungarian Church has maintained little 
political influence since the establishment of democracy. In 1989 when the Hungarian 
communist government met with the leaders of the major opposition factions for 
roundtable negotiations, the Church was absent (Moss, 1994). The Hungarian Church's 
apathy, the high levels of secular values, and the mental association linking the Church to 
Hungary's communist past have forced the Church to reestablish its legitimacy as an 
institution through individuals. 
The religious mission of the Spanish Church is not as explicit as the other cases. 
As in the case of Brazil, the Spanish Church has historically fought against modernity. 
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With the acceptance of religious pluralism and modernity under Vatican II the Spanish 
• 
Church was faced with ideological crisis. The Spanish Church could have either reverted 
to a model of evangelical simplicity, universal love, and downplayed the Church's 
institutional aspects or reverted to a model ofnational Catholicism whereby it continued 
to impose Christian morals on the whole of the Spanish nation. The Spanish Church 
chose the former. Its present ideological approach places more emphasis on the personal 
and ethical constructs of religion. The Spanish Church maintained its political neutrality 
following democratization, but its personal and ethical emphasis has left the Church 
space to justify involvement in politics over moral and ethical issues, as shown in the 
case of abortion policy. Over time the Church has "devalued the laity's expectations and 
aspirations for achieving their salvation through sacramental practices" and stressed 
temporal activities (Perez-Diaz, 1993). The Spanish Church struggles to maintain 
influence even within the realm ofprivate morality, the likelihood of it adopting a more 
national religious mission is unlikely. 
Influence of the International Church 
The influence of the International Church is an important variable affecting the 
political influence ofnational Churches. As the earlier table shows, there appears to be a 
connection between a higher degree ofVatican involvement and high levels ofChurch 
influence in politics. Levels of cooperation between national Churches and the 
International Church, however, vary over time and region. The relationship between the 
International Church and the political influence of a national Church is a tenuous one and 
a more thoughtful analysis ofpost-transition political influence would need to be pursued 
to fully understand such a relationship. 
Within the four cases, only the Polish and Brazilian Church have been highly 
influenced by the international Catholic hierarchy. Brazil, as previously mentioned, has 
been chided by the Vatican for its increasingly progressive role in social politics in 
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Brazil. Poland, on the other hand, being the first ofthe Central and Eastern European 
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countries to obtain democracy was chosen by Pope John Paul II to be an example for 
other Catholic Churches experiencing a democratic transition. Poland was also seen as a 
means to re-evangelize Europe, thus reuniting the East and West (Eberts, 1998). 
Under the former communist regime, official ties between the Vatican and Poland 
were severed. One of the first actions made within the new Polish democracy was the 
renewal of full diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland on July 17, 1989. 
More importantly, the Polish Church was seen by the Vatican, specifically Pope John 
Paul II, as a means to reincorporate Central and Eastern Europe into the world church and 
to create a unified Europe. The selection of the Polish Church as an example for other 
Central and Eastern European countries belonging to the third wave of democratization is 
not surprising considering the Pope's Polish roots. The establishment of democracy 
within Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries has given the 
International Church a clean slate and a chance to reform the present International 
Church and its relations with national churches. Ralph Della Cava has cited three basic 
goals of the International Church: (1) greater centralization within the papacy and the 
Roman Curia1; (2) the imposition ofa unilaterally redefined doctrinal orthodoxy; 
(3)greater uniformity in liturgy and ecclesiastical organization (1990 and 1993). The 
Vatican has remained active in Poland in order to curb the Polish Church's excessive 
political role. The Polish Church has not fought Vatican control. Just following the 
institution of democracy, a group ofCatholic lawyers drafted a restrictive abortion with 
the hope of receiving quick legislative approval. The Polish Church expected to give the 
ratified law to Pope John Paul II as a gift during his first visit to democratic Poland 
(Eberts, 1998). Although the bill failed, a restrictive law was eventually instituted. 
7 The Roman Curia is the collection of ministries for governing the International Church (Della Cava, 
1993). 
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Within the Brazilian case, the Roman Curia have retained the right to control 
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episcopal nominations and even the nomination ofbishops rather than allowing the 
CNBB this right. At the national and diocesan levels, the Roman Curia has created 
episicopal commissions for doctrine within Brazil. These were designed with the intent 
purpose of curbing doctrinal dissent characteristic of the Brazilian Church under the 
policies of Vatican II (Della Cava, 1993). Beginning in the post-war era, the 
International Catholic Church has granted the Brazilian Church, along with many others, 
control of their own resources as well as choice over the direction of their allocation and 
disbursement of funds. Nonetheless, this was reversed in the mid to late 1970s. This was 
the result ofthe Vatican's increasingly dismal financial situation and the misuses of 
philanthropy in the eyes ofthe Vatican (Della Cava, 1990). The requirements of 
hierarchical obedience from the upper to lower echelons ofthe Catholic Church, has 
created tension within the Brazilian Church. The Church, known for its innovative grass 
roots religious and social movements, has increasingly resisted its required obedience. 
Conflicts continually arise over ideology and resources. Financially, Brazil is one ofthe 
main benefactors ofthe Vatican's budget since it houses the largest Catholic population· 
in the world and many Brazilians rely on the Church for social and financial support 
(Della Cava, 1990). It is likely this will become a concern in Central and Eastern Europe 
as well, given the current financial situations within many of these states. It is plausible 
the lower echelons of the hierarchy will begin soliciting aid outside the realm of the 
Vatican. Thus the International Church has increasingly shown it is incapable of dealing 
with all the repercussions of democratization and the new societal problems resulting 
from it. With institutional and financial crisis continually looming over the International 
Church, it is obvious it cannot support the programs capable of improving conditions in 
these new democracies while simultaneously focusing on re-incorporating national 
Churches into the international hierarchy in an effort to create a 'World Church'. 
20
 
•
 
Conclusions and Predictions 
Each ofthe explanatory variables not only affects the Church's religious hold within 
a new democracy, but they are also fundamental in explaining the Church's political 
influence. These are in no way the only forces influencing the Church's political role 
since transition but only those with the most relevance. As shown, Poland emerged from 
the transition with a Catholic Church claiming a right to exert influence within the 
political realm. It has successfully exerted this influence over policy issues ranging from 
abortion to religious education to clerical funding. On the other end of the spectrum, the 
Spanish Church emerged from the transition voluntarily choosing a position of neutrality. 
Despite the variance between these two extremes of political influence, there is evidence 
the Polish Church, and to a lesser extent the Brazilian Church, may decline in influence 
over time for a variety of reasons. 
With the centralization and reintegration efforts ofthe Vatican becoming increasingly 
prominent, there seems to be an increasing strain on national Churches to pacify the 
International Church while also accommodating the distinct needs of the laity. This will· 
especially be the case in Churches where questions of secularization and plurality 
continually threaten a Church (i.e. Poland and Brazil). Excessive interference of 
International Church policies in the national context may create a rift between the 
national Church and the citizenry. This could lead to a decline in influence over the laity, 
which over time could diminish any direct political role of the Church (Della Cava, 1990 
and 1993; Casanova, 1993). In both Brazil and Poland, it is unclear whether the Vatican's 
influence has played a positive role. In Brazil, the Vatican interrupted a progressive 
experience that potentially could have increased the position of the Catholic Church 
within Brazil. In Poland, the Church's efforts to please the Vatican hierarchy may have 
actually created a chasm between the laity and the Polish Church. This gap may be 
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impossible to overcome, as the Polish people become more alienated from the Polish 
• 
Church. 
The trend toward the inclusion of the laity is likely to increase tensions between 
national Churches and the International Church. The Vatican's financial situation is dire, 
as are its human resources. These international dilemmas stemming from secularization 
and a general decline in church attendance have limited the International Church's 
financial resources. However, there are signs the International Church may try to reach 
out directly to the laity in an effort to diminish laity alienation. In March 2000, Pope 
John Paul II publicly apologized for the Church's treatment of Jews and women, and its 
role in the Crusades and the Inquisition. More recently the Pope made a highly 
publicized tour of Israel. The increased visibility of the Pope and the willingness of the 
International Church to apologize for its mistakes can be interpreted as the Church's 
willingness to reach out to the people, thus acknowledging potential difficulties with its 
centralizing stance. It is too soon to know, however, ifthe International Church is simply 
bypassing national Churches by appealing to the laity or seeking to work with them. 
Over time Churches must adapt to the market-like environment yielded by 
democracy. This will inevitably require Churches to adopt a more individualist posture. 
The present research suggests a reevaluation or redefinition of the Church's political role 
is occurring. This means Churches are not only adapting to pluralism and the continual 
presence of civil and secular values, but they are fundamentally changing the way they 
participate in politics. This occurring not only in Churches that maintained close ties 
with the former regime, but also in Churches that played an instrumental role in the 
transition to democracy. Since the documents of Vatican II, the Brazilian Church has 
protected the voice of the people through CEBs and conveyed social concerns to the 
government. Although the Brazilian Church maintains a hybrid of individual and 
institutional political influence, its concern for the laity surpasses that maintained by the 
Polish Church. In Brazil, the vast majority of religious conversions have been from 
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Catholicism to more laity-oriented denominations, mainly Pentecostals, suggesting a 
rejection of the hierarchical structure of Roman Catholicism. 
Poland has been unable downplay its direct political influence and been incapable 
of playing by the democratic rules of the game. This was expressed in January 1993 when 
the Polish episcopate journeyed to Rome for scheduled visits required by all Bishops 
every five years. The visit clearly demonstrated the senior members of the Polish 
episcopate had been unable or unsuccessful in defining a new style of public engagement. 
Evidence of this was the slipping of the Church from the most trusted institution to the 
fourth most trusted, falling behind even the army, the ombudsman and the police 
(Wiegel, 1994). At this juncture, Pope John Paul II took action stating "the Church is not 
a political party nor is she to be identified with any political party; she is above them, 
open to all people of good will, and no political party can claim the right to represent her" 
(Weigel, 1994). This suggests the religious doctrine of national Catholicism is being 
replaced by the Vatican, specifically, Pope John Paul II. Since the Pope's clear statement 
in 1993, the episcopate has issued a national pastoral letter read in all Polish churches 
stating it was the laity's role to carry Christian values into the public sphere and not the· 
role of the institutional church. With public opinion increasingly pitted against the Polish 
Church's carryover of former nationalist ideology, it is likely that the Polish Church will 
be forced to offer a more personal religious stance in the future and distance itself from 
the political realm. 
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